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Abstract Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach
is not only a helpful approach to development problems but
can also be employed as a general ethical-anthropological
framework in ‘advanced’ societies. This paper explores its
normative force for evaluating information technologies,
with a particular focus on the issue of human enhancement.
It suggests that the capability approach can be a useful way
of to specify a workable and adequate level of analysis in
human enhancement discussions, but argues that any
interpretation of what these capabilities mean is itself
dependent on (interpretations of) the techno-human prac-
tices under discussion. This challenges the capability
approach’s means-end dualism concerning the relation
between on the one hand technology and on the other hand
humans and capabilities. It is argued that instead of facing
a choice between development and enhancement, we better
reflect on how we want to shape human-technological
practices, for instance by using the language of capabilities.
For this purpose, we have to engage in a cumbersome
hermeneutics that interprets dynamic relations between
unstable capabilities, technologies, practices, and values.
This requires us to modify the capability approach by
highlighting and interpreting its interpretative dimension.
Keywords Capabilities  Information technology 
Human enhancement  Ethics  Human-technology
relations  Hermeneutics
Introduction
Information technologies such as social network sites, com-
puter games, and tele-monitoring in health care create new
spaces of action and experience but also raise many ethical
questions. For instance, do social network sites threaten our
privacy? Do they promote friendship? Are computer games
anti-social? Is tele-monitoring of people in their homes a
violation of people’s autonomy or does it empower them?
Information technologies like the Internet and mobile phones
change our lives and it is not obvious that these changes are
always for the better. Moreover, the ethical concerns only
grow once we consider the possibility of using information
technology for improving or ‘enhancing’ humans: so-called
human enhancement. For instance, should we ‘enlarge’ or
‘extend’ our cognitive capacities by (directly) connecting our
brains to a computer? Is this a vision of the future or are we
already ‘extending our mind’ when we use electronic devices
such as PCs and mobile phones? How can philosophical
ethics engage with these concerns?
One way of analysing and evaluating what information
technologies do and might do to humans and society is
using the capability approach as a normative-ethical
framework. The approach helps us to phrase the ethical
question as being concerned with how information tech-
nologies impact on human capabilities, in particular the
‘central’ human capabilities (see below), and how they
might even remove capabilities or add new capabilities
(both central and specific). Rather than asking how infor-
mation technology changes or ‘extends’ our ‘minds’ or
‘bodies’, then, this functional approach allows us to high-
light how information technologies shape what people are
(or will) actually be able to do. What matters for ethics is
not so much what the technology does to our brains, minds,
or bodies but rather what it enables us to do, how it impacts
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on our actual and potential functionings or capabilities we
have as humans and as the particular persons we are living
in a particular societal, cultural, and technological context.
I will summarize the main claims of the capability
approach below. But since to employ the capability
approach for ethical purposes and in relation to information
technologies may strike some readers as unusual, let me
first provide some justifications for this broad and general
use of the approach.
The capability approach as a broad and general
normative framework
The capability approach has attracted considerable interest
from researchers in many academic fields, ranging from
development studies and welfare economics to education
and philosophy. This is unsurprising. While in practice
capability theorists are often concerned with people in
‘development’ issues (e.g. poverty), the scope and potential
significance of the approach is far broader in several senses.
First, the capability approach is equally applicable to
economically and technologically ‘advanced’ societies.
‘Development’ has always been broadly defined by Sen and
others, for example as ‘a process of expanding the real free-
doms that people enjoy’ (Sen 1999, p. 3). Thus, there is
nothing intrinsic to the capability approach that gives us a
reason to restrict the scope of the approach to people in
development countries. Moreover, there is a universalist and
emancipatory dimension to the capability approach. The focus
is on capabilities we have as humans, that is, all humans. As
Martha Nussbaum puts it using a quasi-Kantian idiom:
The capability approach is fully universal: the capa-
bilities in question are held to be important for each
and every citizen, in each and every nation, and each
person is to be treated as an end. (Nussbaum 2006,
p. 78)
Nussbaum believes that her list of capabilities ‘can gather
broad cross-cultural agreement’ similar to human rights
(Nussbaum 2006, p. 78). This universalism implies, among
other things, that the applicability of the capability
approach extends to discussions about the use of, for
instance, information technology in ‘advanced’ and ‘devel-
oped’ countries (see below).
Second, as a normative framework the approach can and
has been used for several purposes. As Robeyns writes in
her survey, it can be used for the evaluation of ‘individual
well-being and social arrangements, the design of policies,
and proposals about social change in society’ (Robeyns
2005, p. 94). As such, it can inform both philosophical
reflection and empirical research.
Third, within the domain of normative theory, the
approach has a more general potential than its main
theorists and interpreters tend to allow. For example,
Nussbaum says that her conception of human functioning
and capability is a ‘partial’ conception of the good life and
a ‘moral conception selected for political purposes only’
(Nussbaum 2000, p. 77; my emphasis). Moreover, it even
seems that—firmly remaining within the spirit of philo-
sophical liberalism—Nussbaum wants to avoid making
(substantive) claims about the good life at all. However,
these reservations and self-imposed limitations underesti-
mate the capability approach’s normative potential. With
the work of Nussbaum and others the capability approach
has assumed the character of a more general, attractive
normative framework that concerns itself with core issues
in liberal and neo-Aristotelian political and moral theory
such as individual well-being, justice (e.g. social justice
and global justice), human dignity, and human excellence
(the good life, human flourishing). As I will show below,
the step to ethics, in particular good life ethics, has already
been taken by Nussbaum. Moreover, since Sen and Nuss-
baum are keen to keep their formulations of capabilities at
a general, vague level in order to keep their theory wide
open to conceptual adjustment and applicable to many
different societies and circumstances (see below), one may
well wonder how ‘partial’ the scope of their conception and
their theoretical ambitions really are.
Finally, as I will show below the approach could be
interpreted as having connections to other sub-domains of
philosophy such as philosophical anthropology and meta-
physics since the central capabilities can be interpreted as
an expression of what it is to be human and since the
approach raises the question if that is a matter of con-
ceiving of a ‘freestanding’ moral notion (see below) or if it
is dependent on culture and context.
But whether or not my suggestions about what the
capability approach should do in terms of scope is
acceptable to those who think of themselves as capability
theorists, it should be clear by now that the capability
approach is a broad conceptual framework, ranging over
many disciplines, domains, and issues, and indeed allowing
and fostering different interpretations. In addition, I shall
assume in the following discussion that it has normative
force and potential in both politics and ethics.
Aims of this paper
This paper aims to discuss the capability approach, in
particular Nussbaum’s version of it, by exploring the pre-
cise nature of the relation between capabilities and infor-
mation technologies. It will do so by discussing this
question in the light of emerging possibilities for human
enhancement. This will bring out a significant benefit of the
capability approach: it allows us to define a helpful level of
analysis (capabilities) and—eventually—to redefine the
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issue of human enhancement in a novel way. However, this
discussion will also challenge an important philosophical
assumption made by (my interpretation of) the capability
approach related to its view of the relation between capa-
bilities and technology. It will suggest that the end/means
scheme as applied to the relation between capabilities and
technology must be abandoned and replaced by a herme-
neutics of techno-human change, involving interpretations
of dynamic relations between unstable capabilities, tech-
nologies, practices, and values. This requires us to use the
capability approach in a way that highlights its interpre-
tative dimension.
First I will provide a brief outline the capability
approach and its recent theoretical developments in order
to set it up as an ethical-normative framework. Then I will
introduce the problem of the relation between capabilities
and technology and discuss this problem in the light of the
issue of human enhancement. I end with further remarks on
how the (philosophical version of the) capability approach
can be enriched in terms of method. Throughout the paper I
will use the example of social networking sites and the
capability of affiliation—not only in order to render my
reflections relevant to issues in ethics of information
technology, but also to give more substance to my core
argument about capabilities and techno-human change.
The capability approach: from human development
to human dignity and human excellence
The capability approach emerged in response to previous
approaches to development studies or welfare economics,
which focused on overall economic measures, utility, and
material resources, but neglected the issue of (fair) distri-
bution and the abilities of people to transform resources
into valuable activities. For Amartya Sen, usually regarded
as the founder of the capability approach, a focus on
capabilities or ‘real freedoms that people enjoy’ was to
replace ‘narrower views of development, such as identi-
fying development with the growth of gross national
product, or with the rise in personal incomes’ (Sen 1999,
p. 3). Sen wanted to put the emphasis on the objectives
(capabilities, freedoms), not on the means to reach those
objectives (resources, social and economic arrangements,
technological progress, etc.).
This view has not only been highly successful in eco-
nomics and policy (consider the UN’s Human Develop-
ment Index, inspired by Sen’s approach); it has also
inspired philosophical work. In particular, partly in col-
laboration with Sen (Nussbaum and Sen 1993; Nussbaum
2000, 2006), Martha Nussbaum has articulated a version of
the capability approach that defines well-being in terms of
capabilities. In Frontiers of Justice (2006) this philosophical
development of the approach has taken the form of a more
systematic argument that engages with Rawls’s contractar-
ian thinking and with various historical-philosophical
sources. Nussbaum argues that her list of capabilities is
founded on the principle of human dignity, an idea which has
roots in Marx, Grotius, and Aristotle.
The basic intuitive idea of my version of the capa-
bilities approach is that we begin with a conception of
the dignity of the human being, and of a life that is
worthy of that dignity (…). (Nussbaum 2006, p. 74)
Nussbaum’s conception of dignity is based on Nussbaum’s
reading of Marx in the sense that human beings are seen as
standing in need of many (opportunities for) activities
(p. 74). It is inspired by Grotius’ natural law theory in the
sense that Nussbaum agrees with Grotius that humans have
a natural sociability and that political theory should be
based on dignity and sociability (p. 36). It is neo-
Aristotelian in the sense that for her human beings are
political animals, that is, they are rational but they are also
bodily, vulnerable, needy beings and in Nussbaum’s
interpretation this animality is not opposed to rationality;
instead, they are ‘thoroughly unified’ (p. 159).
This concept of dignity is then used as a basis for the
capabilities. According to Nussbaum, dignity requires ‘an
appropriate threshold level’ (p. 75) of the following ‘cen-
tral’ human capabilities (my summary):
1. life: ‘Being able to live to the end of a human life of
normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s
life is so reduced as to be not worth living’
2. bodily health (includes nourishment and shelter)
3. bodily integrity: free movement, freedom from sexual
assault and violence, having opportunities for sexual
satisfaction
4. being able to use your senses, imagination, and
thought; experiencing and producing culture, free-
dom of expression and freedom of religion
5. emotions: being able to have attachments to things
and people
6. practical reason: being able to engage in a concep-
tion of the good and critical reflection about the
planning of one’s life
7. affiliation: being able to live with and toward others,
imagine the other, and respect the other
8. other species: being able to live with concern to
animals, plants and nature
9. play: being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recrea-
tional activities
10. control over one’s environment: political choice and
participation, being able to hold property, being able
to work as a human being in mutual recognition
(Nussbaum 2006, pp. 76–78; my summary)
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This philosophical articulation of the capability
approach has strong normative appeal. It is not only a
useful approach to welfare problems in development
countries or to problems of national and global justice
(Nussbaum 2006; Coeckelbergh 2007). As I argued above,
it can be applied in ‘advanced’ societies as well as devel-
opment countries and its thematic reach goes beyond issues
of justice. Moreover, I have suggested that it can be used as
a general ethical framework.
As an ethical framework, it can support a sufficitarian
argument but there are also other options. In line with
Nussbaum’s neo-Aristotelian thinking, the capabilities can
be understood not only as minimal requirements or
‘thresholds’ for dignity or justice, as Nussbaum usually
sees them, but rather as formulations of the ethical ‘max-
imum’: they can be interpreted as what the good life or
human flourishment requires.1 Nussbaum admits that after
having identified the threshold, ‘we seek a higher thresh-
old, the level above which not just mere human life, but
good life, becomes possible’ (Nussbaum 2006, p. 181). In
this interpretation, Nussbaum’s list amounts to an ‘objec-
tive-list’ approach to what delineates a space of possibility
for living good, flourishing lives. This does not mean
that—with Nussbaum—we have to say that there is only
one good life. Given the condition of pluralism in our
societies, it seems wise to move beyond Aristotle on this
point and this interpretation is supported by Nussbaum. She
remarks that in contrast to Aristotle she holds that there is
not one single idea of human flourishing but rather ‘a space
for diverse possibilities for flourishing’ (Nussbaum 2006,
p. 182). Understood as a neo-Aristotelian articulation of
human excellence, then, the capability approach lists ele-
ments that constitute what it is to be fully human. As such,
Nussbaum’s capability approach makes a substantive claim
about what it is to be human (anthropological claim) and
what constitutes good lives (ethical claim). In the latter
role, the list can be used as an instrument to guide and
evaluate human-technological practices in the way pro-
posed in the introduction.
In so far as the approach makes explicit what we value
and what we are, it can offer ethical guidance in many
domains. For instance, elsewhere I have proposed to apply
the approach to health care (Coeckelbergh 2010). Here I
will use the example of social network sites (see the next
section).
Before moving to the evaluation of (information) tech-
nologies, however, I would like to add an important qual-
ification to my claim that the capabilities list is based on
human dignity and on what we are as humans. If presented
in this way, Nussbaum’s argument could be easily
misunderstood as saying that the concept of human dignity
and the related capabilities are given to us in a priori
reflection. This would be an Aristotelian or Grotian inter-
pretation; both thinkers based their political views on a
metaphysical theory of human nature. But Nussbaum
rejects such a metaphysical foundation and instead endor-
ses a procedural basis of the list. The list ‘is not the result
of ‘a or priori metaphysical investigation into the nature of
human beings’, as Jo¨mann et al. correctly observe (Jo¨mann
et al. 2001, p. 67) but is far more open: Nussbaum suggests
that the list is a matter of (real-world) political agreement,
which in its Rawlsian version must be understood as
involving exercises of imagination similar to what happens
in Rawls’s ‘Original Position’:
Frequently we inform ourselves about alternative
possibilities by imagining the form of life that these
possibilities would construct, asking ourselves what
suffering or flourishing there would be in lives gov-
erned by these political principles. (Nussbaum 2006,
p. 353)
One can imagine a similar procedure with regard to
capabilities as an approach to ethics. This would allow
room for interpretation. (I will return to this point.)
To show the full normative force of this ethical
interpretation of the capability approach would require
more work. But this short presentation of the theory is
sufficient for my purposes in this paper and allows me to
proceed with my argument. I will now introduce and
discuss the question concerning the relation between
capabilities and technology, in particular information
technology.
Capabilities and technology
In the literature on the capability approach, technology has
only recently emerged as a topic for discussion. Most work
concerns development countries and the approach is being
applied to various fields in applied ethics, for instance
design ethics (Oosterlaken 2009), ethics of risk (Murphy
and Gardoni 2008), bioethics (Clague 2006), and ethics of
information technology (Johnstone 2007; Wresch 2007;
Zheng 2007; Coeckelbergh 2010).
The usual way to define the relation between capabilities
and technology is, as Sen did, to conceive of technology as
one of the means to reach the aims (capabilities). Applied
to the domain of information technology, the idea is that
just having (access to) the resources like a PC or a mobile
electronic device is not enough to enjoy, for instance,
exercising one’s capability for affiliation. Instead, what
matters is that the person can actually and effectively use
the technology for that kind of activities.
1 I leave open if this is also what Marx’s notion of ‘truly human
functioning’ requires.
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Today the term ‘empowerment’ is often used to
emphasise this shift from means to ends as promoted by the
capability approach (see Johnstone 2007). For instance, it
is said that we face what is known in computer ethics as the
‘digital divide’. This gap does not only concern mere
access to information technology. Norris has used the term
to refer to divergence in Internet access between indus-
trialised societies and developing societies, between
information rich and information poor (this also happens in
industrialised societies), and between those who use this
information to engage and participate in public life and
those who do not (Norris 2001, p. 4). The third definition,
with its emphasis on use, is interesting with regard to
empowerment. Viewed from a capability perspective, the
digital divide is a gap not so much between those who have
access to the Internet and those who have not, but between
those who have the skills to use it and benefit from it in
their social lives (private and professional) and those who
do not have these skills. Thus, if the capability approach is
interpreted as a normative framework, the ethical question
concerns the extent to which the goals (the capabilities) are
reached by means of the technology. Political participation
is one of these goals. On the one hand, there are the ulti-
mate human ends (human dignity, justice, human flour-
ishing) articulated by means of the capability approach,
which defines, analyses and applies the capabilities that
contribute to these ends, such as health, emotions, practical
reason, affiliation, etc., and on the other hand, there are the
various means to reach these ends (technology, social and
political organisation, and so on).
In the next section, I will question this exclusively
instrumental view of the relation between technological
matters (in particular information technology) and human-
ethical matters (capabilities as articulations of human
excellence, dignity, justice, etc.). For that purpose I will
focus on the issue of human enhancement and its impli-
cations for the relation between information technologies
and capabilities.
Human dignity or human enhancement?
One reason why the discussion about human enhancement
is interesting is that it helps us to question the philoso-
phical-anthropological basis of the capability approach and
its assumption that the relation between capabilities and
technology is merely instrumental. Let me explain this.
Human enhancement and the question concerning
the relation between humans and technology
Human enhancement aims at using technology to create
better humans. What this means can best be clarified by
saying what it is not: its aim is not therapeutic: it does not
restore humans to a ‘normal’ state but wants to create
humans that are ‘better than normal’, ‘better than human’.
Information technology is one of the ‘converging tech-
nologies’ that can be used for this purpose, next to inter-
ventions in the human genome (e.g. by means of germ line
engineering). For instance, Ray Kurzweil has suggested
that we might ‘upload’ ourselves into digital spheres
(Kurzweil 2005). Perhaps we are already ‘enhanced’ given
that we extend our mind by using the internet: cognitive
functions such as memory are ‘extended’ with the help of
information technology. Applied to social network sites,
one could say that its related social-technological practices
‘extend’ or ‘enhance’ our capability of affiliation. Like
letters, phones, mobile phones, and other communication
technologies, they extend our capability from face-to-face
interactions to distant interactions. Moreover, they expand
the quantity and frequency of possible contacts, enlarging
our social world and revealing it as a network.
As this example shows, the distinction between therapy
(and current or ‘normal’ use) and enhancement is vague.
The alphabet, letters, and letter-writing were already a form
of ‘enhancement’, not only in terms of communicative
abilities but also of memory and reflection. Writing has
always been created ‘external’ capacity for memory and
has influenced the way we think (writing as a technology
for thinking). Consider also the dramatic increase in the life
span of people in the course of the twentieth century,
caused by mere ‘therapeutic’ measures in medicine and
health policy. Put in the language of capabilities, these
‘hardware’ modifications and ‘extensions’ meant that
people could do more, here: could enjoy improved capa-
bilities of affiliation, health, and other capabilities.
In spite of this blurred boundary between enhancement
and what is considered to be ‘normal’ or ‘therapeutic’,
proposals for future human enhancement (e.g. by means of
genetic modification) made by ‘transhumanists’ such as
Bostrom (2003, 2005) and Harris (2007) have invited
opposition from philosophers who fear a ‘Brave New
World’ or see human enhancement as a threat to human
dignity (see for example Kass 2003; Habermas 2001;
Fukuyama 2002). For instance, Habermas has argued that if
parents can decide about the genome of their (future)
children, this would restrict their children’s range of
options.
Against the ‘Brave New World’ objection, Agar and
Harris have proposed ‘liberal’ versions of human
enhancement (Agar 2004; Harris 2007). And in response to
Habermas’s objections to genetic enhancement, Bostrom
has argued that human enhancement is neither a threat to
freedom nor to dignity. First, he argues that the child would
not have less freedom than in the case when its genome is
left up to chance. Rather, an enhanced individual ‘would
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enjoy significantly more choice and autonomy in her life, if
the modifications were such as to expand her basic capa-
bility set. Being healthy, smarter, having a wide range of
talents, or possessing greater powers of self-control are
blessings that tend to open more life paths than they block’
(Bostrom 2005, p. 212; my emphasis). I will return to this
thought. Second, Bostrom sees no reason why ‘posthu-
mans’ would have less dignity:
Transhumanists (…) insist that dignity, in its modern
sense, consists in what we are and what we have the
potential to become, not in our pedigree or our causal
origin. What we are is not a function solely of our
DNA but also of our technological and social context.
Human nature in this broader sense is dynamic, par-
tially human-made, and improvable. (Bostrom 2005,
p. 213)
It is neither my purpose to defend human enhancement nor
to provide a comprehensive overview of the arguments for
and against. Here I am interested in how this discussion can
contribute to a critique and alternative development of the
capability approach. Let us consider the following signif-
icant assumption of the capability approach. Nussbaum’s
version of the approach sees technology only as a means,
an instrument, which has nothing to do with what the
human is (and with human dignity and the central
capabilities). However, the transhumanist view as summa-
rised above suggests otherwise. Capabilities—and hence
what humans are—are not fixed but change together with
our technological and social context. This is not only true
for specific new capabilities (imagine that technology
would give us wings) but also for the core capabilities that
are related to what we consider (the core of) the human.
Technology is not a mere ‘condition’ for human being in
the sense of a means that can be used to achieve human
ends; rather, human existence is already a human-techno-
logical existence. As Plessner put it in the language of an
entirely different tradition (twentieth century philosophical
anthropology), we are ‘naturally artificial’ (Plessner 1928),
technology is part of what we are.
If this is true, then those who oppose human enhance-
ment can no longer rely in their arguments on a static view
of human nature and an instrumental view of technology.
Moreover, a discussion of the relation between human
enhancement and capabilities allows us to reframe the
normative question of the capability approach and to
reformulate the normative question concerning human
enhancement at the same time.
Using the language of capabilities, we could start by
asking: Should we aim at human development (reaching
minimum levels of capabilities) and perhaps human
excellence (maximising levels of capabilities), or should
we aim at human enhancement (changing the capabilities
by technological or other means)? Considered as a nor-
mative project and redefined in terms of capabilities,
transhumanist visions of human enhancement such as Bo-
strom’s aim not at evaluating or measuring the distance
between existing levels and fixed, ideal levels of capabil-
ities, but aims at moving and lifting the very ‘ideal’ or
‘maximum’ levels of capabilities themselves. Perhaps it
even wants to add new capabilities and erase others.
(It remains unsure what the status of new capabilities
would be. Would they be ‘central’? Arguably, the status of
capabilities could change and further reflection on the
status of new capabilities might blur the strict distinction
between ‘central’ and ‘specific’ capabilities: some capa-
bilities which we first regarded as specific may come to be
seen as ‘central’. Take up the example again: if humans
had wings then we might come to regard that as a ‘central’
capability and anyone taking away the wings would then be
regarded as violating entitlement to a human capability.
Indeed, flying with wings could be regarded as a changed
capability of bodily integrity/freedom of movement. A
human without wings might be considered as violated in
her bodily integrity. Thus, it is not always clear if a
capability is ‘new’ and whether or not it is, is subject to
societal-cultural change. The example of wings also sug-
gests that proponents of human enhancement may want to
enhance aspects such as beauty or intelligence and it
remains to be discussed if and how these relate to capa-
bilities—central or otherwise. Many of us would not put
them on the list of central capabilities. However, as
Nussbaum argues, the list is open-ended and its very
boundaries could be the object of political deliberation.)
Of course, as with the standard capability approach,
various technologies (as well as educational and other
practices) can be considered as means for reaching the aim
(maximizing capabilities and adding new ones). But the
difference with Nussbaum’s view is that here the norms
(defined as end-levels of the capabilities) or new norms
(the precise form of the new capabilities) are not fixed. In
this way, this view goes beyond the ends/means scheme:
the meaning of the capabilities themselves (the standards,
the norms, the criteria, and the aims) are no longer con-
sidered as unchangeable. There is a dynamic relation
between capabilities and technologies which can neither
exhaustively nor adequately be defined in terms of ends
and means.
However, if capabilities are already changing and have
always changed, then the initial ethical question with
regard to human enhancement (development or enhance-
ment) is not the right question to ask. The normative
question is no longer if we should change human nature but
how we should change it. Moreover, given the blurred line
between ‘enhancement’ and what is ‘normal’ or ‘thera-
peutic’, the question is no longer about ‘enhancement’ but
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about change. But what is the object of change? Using the
capabilities concept, we can now ask more precise ques-
tions at a more ‘workable’ level of analysis. First we must
ask descriptive questions about which capabilities and
related practices change in which contexts, how they
change, and as a result of which interventions they change;
we must ask about the possible effects if we did this par-
ticular technological-social intervention, created this envi-
ronment etc., before we can make decisions about which
changes and indeed norms are desirable. For example, we
should first know what some particular Internet-related
practices like on-line social networking do (or would do) to
our capabilities before we can decide the normative ques-
tion about the desirability of these techno-human practices.
If there are plans for a new technology, it means we have to
try to imagine what it would do to human capabilities.
Using the language of capabilities allows us to ask
precise normative and descriptive philosophical questions
at a level that is situated between vague general notions
such as ‘human nature’ (often used in traditional philoso-
phy) and all too concrete and ontologically atomistic
notions such as ‘genes’, ‘neurons’, or ‘codes’ (often used
by scientists). This can throw new light on a long-standing
methodological difficulty. Ethics and philosophical
anthropology are usually challenged to choose between
naturalist and non-naturalist approaches. For instance, we
are asked to choose between a naturalist view of the human
as embodied brain (neuroscience as a gateway to knowl-
edge about the human, determinism) and the human as
having a ‘special’ moral and metaphysical position
(involving notions such as free will—for instance Kantian
views of the human). But if we use capabilities as an in-
between concept, this might turn out to be a false dilemma
for at least the following reasons.
Scientific challenges to the instrumentalist assumption
First, naturalist or scientific views need not be reductionist
and even from a ‘purely’ scientific point of view it is not
very fruitful to deny the interrelations or even merging of
‘natural’ and ‘artificial’, of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’, of
humans and technology. To forge firm conceptual con-
nections between, on the one hand, the human and, on the
other hand, technological practices and social contexts, is
not only imperative for philosophers who want to under-
stand the human but is also a matter of doing good science.
Consider controversies about (interventions in) the human
genome. Those who argue against ‘genetic enhancement’ or
those who embrace the idea without knowing much about it,
may actually overestimate the impact of interventions in the
‘genes’ of people and hold a more deterministic view than the
scientists who work on it. As Lewontin has argued, genes
should not be considered in isolation; instead, biologists now
accept that there is a complex interplay between genes,
organism, and environment (Lewontin 2001). There is neither
determinism nor reductionism here: biological traits are
understood as being the result of genes, chance, and envi-
ronment; organisms are open systems (Lewontin 2001, 113).
Genes are neither a ‘blueprint’ nor a central controller. Moss
has argued that ‘gene-centric’ views, which place genes in
central control of the organism’s development, must be
replaced with a de-centralized approach that includes inter-
cellular, biochemical and sociological factors (Moss 2003).
And Salvi has shown that the claim that it is possible to
manipulate human germ cells in a pre-ordinate way is unre-
alistic, since the long-term consequences of such interventions
in individuals, in generations, and in populations is unpre-
dictable: ‘we cannot predict whether the gene manipulation
will produce a possible expression of the desired character or
if it will cause a cascade of events determining a gene dys-
function […] or subsequent mutations’ (Salvi 2002, 74). And
if we cannot predict the phenotypic expression of bioengi-
neered genes, then we cannot know what it will do to the
individual—including whether or not it will ‘enhance’ that
individual. Salvi even calls germ line engineering to enhance
humans ‘biologically nonsensical’ (Salvi 2002, 76). This casts
doubt on the promises concerning germ line engineering made
by transhumanists and suggests that both defenders and
opponents of human enhancement risk to assume a simplistic,
reductionist view of what science and technology can know
and do.
Ethics of information technology is vulnerable to a
similar risk if and in so far as its arguments are based on
outdated and inadequate ontologies and anthropologies.
People working in information science and information
technology have moved on from considering symbolic
systems in isolation (traditional AI) to non-Cartesian
approaches in cognitive science and philosophy of mind
focusing on embodied cognition, learning by interaction
with the environment, extended mind (Clark and Chalmers
1998; Clark 2003), and so on. AI has moved from the
design of intelligent computers (say, a computer that can
play chess) to the design of intelligent robots, that is,
embodied and interactive AI systems that learn by inter-
acting with their environment, display ‘emotions’, etc. This
orientation may still be ‘naturalist’ or ‘informationalist2’
but fits better with approaches in the social and human
sciences—and indeed the life sciences—than previous
methodologies. Moreover, views such as the ‘extended
mind’ thesis (see again Clark and Chalmers) are compati-
ble with non-instrumentalist views of the relations between
humans and technology, since they do not consider infor-
2 This is how I would describe Floridi’s views.
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mation technologies as mere tools that stand apart from our
minds but as part of our cognitive-embodied whole.3
If ethics of information technology wants to take these
new developments into account, it has various options to do
this. Here I propose that we explore ‘capabilities’ as a
concept that allows us to make ‘translations’ from science
to ethics and back. Capabilities depend on minds-as-
embodied, but also on the technologies and social envi-
ronments that are firmly linked with that cognitive-
embodied whole. Technologies, then, are not a mere means
that contribute to human ends, but are part of a techno-
anthropological whole that has technological, cognitive,
biological and social dimensions and which constitutes
individual capabilities. Moreover, these capabilities are not
fixed but are unstable and changing. For instance, the
capability ‘political participation’ emerges from a dynamic
interplay of beliefs, values, emotions, and the technologi-
cal-social environments in which these dimensions are
shaped (which in turn changes these environments). If the
concept of ‘capabilities’ is understood in this way, it allows
us to talk at a sufficiently high level of abstraction and
organisation, thus avoiding atomistic and reductionist
views of humans, while at the same time taking distance
from philosophical approaches that use vague notions such
as human dignity without making explicit what it means for
beings like us who can only function, exist, think and live
by interaction with concrete technological, social envi-
ronments as cognitive-embodied beings.
Viewed from this perspective, the discussion about
human enhancement in relation to information technology
is not about ‘technology’—at least if that term is under-
stood in terms of material devices such as computers and
mobile phones considered in isolation from the human. It is
about the human-as-already-shaped-by-technology. Fur-
thermore, and this is important given my purpose in this
paper, this perspective also allows us to revise some crucial
assumptions that support current versions of the capabili-
ties approach. Technology does no longer appear as a mere
means to human ends—i.e. as material or technological
conditions for capabilities—but as part of continuously
changing human-technological functionings and practices
which resist categorisation in terms of means or ends alone.
An additional advantage of the capability approach is
that it allows us even to go beyond ‘extensionalism’ and
discussions about ‘where the mind is’ since it takes a
functional approach. The stress is on what people (are able
to) do rather than on the mind or cognitive architecture and
its much discussed relation to brains and bodies. For
instance, instead of comparing brains (wetware) to
computer hardware, or human minds to robot ‘minds’, a
focus on capabilities allows us to focus on how it is to live
our lives with a particular information technology or
information practice like using a social network site. The
entry of analysis is the capability (e.g. social affiliation),
what the technology enables us to do and what we actually
do, rather the particular hardware or software (e.g. a PC or
a mobile phone). As such, the concept of capability as a
functional approach transcends mind–body, software-
hardware, and other dualisms and is in this form different
from other scientific approaches that try to solve mind-
brain and mind–body puzzles. At the same time, it pays
sufficient attention to the material and social conditions
that make functioning possible.
Second, however, if this methodological intervention is
to be really successful with regard to the aim of over-
coming the previously mentioned naturalism/anti-nat-
uralism problems and the problem regarding the human-
technology relation, a further step is necessary. Scientific,
naturalist versions alone are not enough; we also need to
attend to human subjectivity and turn to concepts that
belong to a different, more phenomenological-hermeneutic
tradition: engagement, interpretation, translation.
Ethics and the hermeneutics of capabilities
Hermeneutics, capabilities, and technology
So far it seems as if I have been talking about human-
technological practices and capabilities or (potential)
functionings as if we can look upon them from the position
of ‘Nowhere’ (Nagel), from an ‘objective’ point of view.
But is this possible? Of course we can become aware of
ourselves as the particular humans we are and we can even
generalise about ‘the human’. But recognising the possi-
bility of self-consciousness—which I take Plessner to do
when he coins the concept of ‘ex-centricity’, we can stand
outside of our own centre—should not be confused with
the possibility of taking an absolutely objective point of
view that is alienated from our personal, social, and deeply-
human concerns. We are always already engaged observ-
ers. This means that we cannot talk about capabilities,
beliefs, technologies, social environments, and so on
without being influenced (but not determined) by the very
elements we try to study.
Of course this is a long-standing issue in philosophy and
(philosophy of) social science, and I will not offer a full
account of this methodology here. But if we wish to revise
the capability approach in the direction I suggested above,
it is important to realise that although current scientific
thinking about the relation between humans and technol-
ogy is already very helpful to question the mentioned
3 Note that the ‘extended mind’ view is controversial since it
contradicts common sense and naturalist ‘intracranialist’ views (see
for example Adams and Aizawa 2008 and 2009).
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assumptions of the capability approach, it is not adequate
to capture the hermeneutic dimension of thinking about the
relations humans, capabilities, and technologies. Neither
capabilities nor the cognitive, technological, and social
elements that shape them are given to us as naked ‘facts’.
They have to be constructed by means of work of inter-
pretation, communication, and translation.
For example, if particular Internet-based platforms that
are said to promote social networking are studied in terms
of their influence on cognitive and social ‘factors’—and
hence certain capabilities—then this is not a matter of
‘getting the facts right’ but of carefully constructing what
meaningfully can be said about the new technological
possibilities (current and future), the interplay of these
different elements within particular capability constella-
tion, the interplay of various capabilities, and the changes
in these elements. Scientific studies can contribute to this
but should not be seen as presenting an ‘objective’
description as opposed to ‘subjective’ interpretations; both
go hand in hand. ‘The truth about Twitter’ or ‘the truth
about Facebook’ is not out there to be harvested; it has to
be constructed in slow, difficult process of interpretation
and communication (i.e. dialogues and discussion). Sci-
entific research can contribute to this work of interpretation
but does not exhaust the range of methodological tools we
have.
This hermeneutic dimension is missing in the literature
on capabilities (for instance, what the capability ‘health’ is
and means for a particular person in a particular context is,
apart from other things, a matter of interpretation), but
usually it is also absent in the cited literature on human
enhancement, ethics of information technology, and
embodied and extended cognition. If we want to use their
insights to revise the capability approach, therefore, we
should take the hermeneutical dimension into account. For
instance, the ‘extension’ of minds and how it constitutes
particular capabilities is not something that stands as a
‘fact’ but is a compelling interpretation of techno-human
experiences that has to be confronted with other interpre-
tations and (histories of) changing in techno-human
practices.
Such a hermeneutics does not threaten the normative-
ethical ambitions of the capability approach. On the con-
trary, both presuppose one another. Interpretation is not
ethically neutral but involves judgment. But it also co-
constitutes that judgment: at the same time ethical judgment
depends on adequate interpretations and descriptions/con-
structions of the practices it evaluates and of the concepts
(e.g. the norms) it uses to evaluate these practices. As said,
what a capability means in a particular context is partly a
matter of interpretation. Moreover, in deliberative and
reflective practice—including the political deliberation
recommended by Nussbaum’s capability approach—it is
hard and perhaps even undesirable to make a strict dis-
tinction between the ‘empirical’, imaginative, interpretative
and evaluative aspects. To decide if we want to further
pursue a particular information-technological possibility,
we have to imagine or try out in practice what it does to our
‘capabilities’. Capabilities cannot be considered and used in
isolation since they cannot be strictly distinguished from the
techno-social environments that shape them; their meaning
only emerges in these imaginative-interpretative, delibera-
tive, and empirical-interpretative processes, which already
have an evaluative aspect and co-constitute the evaluation.
Finally, it is important to note that both the evaluation
and the objects of evaluation are subject to change. Tech-
nologies, capabilities, and our evaluation of them do not
have a fixed ‘status’ that can be determined once and for
all. Techno-human practices, values, humans, societies—
they all change. Therefore, any list of capabilities is only in
appearance static: not only because new capabilities might
emerge or because their articulation/expression is neces-
sarily incomplete (as Nussbaum would be ready to admit),
but also because the very meaning of the capabilities
changes. ‘Behind’ the words that appear to be set in stone
(this is what human dignity is, this is what human nature is)
lies a fluid, plasmatic techno-human reality subject to
changing interpretations. For example, behind ‘physical
health’ we find the history of medicine and health care,
which is itself a hermeneutical enterprise dependent on
new technological and conceptual developments. (For
instance, consider how the discussion about ‘human
enhancement’ throws new light on the history of medicine
as a history of enhancement.)
To conclude, I have made suggestions about how the
discussion of human enhancement would gain from a
capabilities approach, but I have also shown that we can
enrich the capability approach as an ethical framework by
abandoning its instrumentalist assumption about the rela-
tion between humans and technology. Alternatives can be
explored by learning from recent thinking in the fields of
(philosophy of) human enhancement and cognitive science,
which are moving beyond atomistic and reductionist views
of humans and are starting to consider the various ways in
which humans are shaped by their techno-social environ-
ment (and vice versa). However, we should take not forget
to add a hermeneutical and historical-dynamical perspec-
tive to these insights if we want to make some progress
with regard to the naturalism/non-naturalism problem.
Towards a re-interpretation of Nussbaum’s capability
approach
Although many users of the capability approach take an
exclusively scientific approach, the proposed hermeneutic
turn proposed here in relation to the capability approach is
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not entirely alien to Nussbaum’s version of the capability
approach. We can and must therefore engage with and
highlight existing aspects of the capability approach that
are compatible with the interpretative direction outlined
above.
For a start, Nussbaum does not deny that technology and
(social) context change capabilities—including the inter-
pretation of capabilities. This is recognised in the literature.
For instance, as Jo¨man et al. remark, Nussbaum’s approach
is ‘thoroughly universalistic’ yet at the same time ‘a more
particularistic or Aristotelian perspective is embedded in
Nussbaum’s overall conception, namely in her openness of
any human capability to a spectrum of diverse tradition-
and culture-related realizations and interpretations’
(Jo¨mann et al. 2001, pp. 65–66). The authors point to
Nussbaum’s insistence that the list implies ‘multiple real-
izablity’. Indeed, in Women and Human Development she
says that the list is open-ended since one might debate how
‘fixed’ each item should be and the items are ‘to some
extent differently constructed by different societies’:
Indeed, part of the idea of the list is its multiple
realizability: its members can be more concretely
specified in accordance with local beliefs and cir-
cumstances. It is thus designed to leave room for a
reasonable pluralism in specification. (Nussbaum
2000, p. 77)
By saying this she suggests not only that possibly some
items on the list might be removed or given less weight4
but also that the threshold level needs to be determined by
political consensus (p. 77).
Nussbaum’s version of particularism raises the well-
known problem of relativism. It seems that if we embrace
her view, we also have to accept that different situations
and contexts will lead to different interpretations of the
capabilities and of the thresholds. However, whether or not
this view is relativistic depends on how we interpret other
passages in Nussbaum. Nussbaum remains at least
ambivalent on this point. Let me discuss this further, not
with the aim to decide if Nussbaum’s view is relativistic
(this would merit a different work), but with the aim to
further refine my interpretation of Nussbaum’s assumptions
concerning the human-technology and capability-technol-
ogy relation.
The interpretative-particularist dimension of her theory
stands in tension with the universalist dimension. Let me
show this by discussing her response to the objection that
her account is relativistic in Frontiers of Justice. She
makes six claims; let me discuss the first three. First, for
Nussbaum the list is ‘open-ended and subject to ongoing
revision and rethinking’ (Nussbaum 2006, p. 78). I inter-
pret this as allowing room for adding, deleting, or re-
interpreting capabilities. This interpretation is supported by
the second claim, which states that the list is kept abstract
‘precisely in order to make room for the activities of
specifying and deliberating by citizens’ and she allows for
different nations doing this ‘somewhat differently, taking
their histories and special circumstances into account’
(p. 79). This would also concord to Nussbaum’s interpre-
tation of Rawls in terms of imagination as noted above:
requiring this exercise of imaginative deliberation would
allow room for taking into account context when inter-
preting capabilities.
Perhaps this interpretation would also allow new capa-
bilities to be added to the list, for instance capabilities that
came about by using human enhancement technologies.
We could evaluate this by informing ourselves about a
particular possibilities offered by a technology and then
imagine (to use Nussbaum’s words) ‘the form of life that
these possibilities would construct, asking ourselves what
suffering or flourishing there would be’ (Nussbaum 2006,
p. 353) in lives governed by that new capability and that
new technology. Such a use of the capability approach
would go beyond the usual use in terms of end/means
(capabilities as ends and technology as means) since we
would have to imagine how both the technology and the
capability shape possibilities for forms of life.
Let me show how this would go beyond present uses of
the capability approach in relation to human enhancement
and explore how more attention for the interpretative side
of the capability approach can assist this aim.
For example, Cooke argues that Sen’s capability
approach can be used as a framework to ensure (a basic
level of) freedom and equality. One of her arguments is
that ‘the proper moral goal of altering the germ-line is to
bring people toward a level of basic freedom rather than to
make choices for future generations’ and that therefore
germ-line engineering should only ensure basic levels of
capabilities (Cooke 2003, p. 43). Whether or not we agree
about her claim that it should ensure basic levels only,
Cooke’s approach assumes an instrumentalist conception
of technology. There are goals (capabilities, freedom,
equality) and technology is a means to realise these goals.
Nevertheless, in Cooke’s article we can also discern some
steps towards a more interpretative view of capabilities.
First, she says that Sen leaves the capabilities vague
enough so that they can be specified ‘on a case-by-case
4 This touches the issue of hierarchy, the relative importance of the
capabilities. On the one hand, Nussbaum claims that all capabilities
are ‘of central importance’ (Nussbaum 2000, p. 81), on the other hand
the consensual, contractarian side of her argument casts doubt on this.
Moreover, at some point she even says that practical reason and
affiliation ‘stand out as of special importance’ (p. 82). This is one of
the many remaining ambivalences in her version of the capability
approach.
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basis’, but this question of application does not seem to
touch the definition of capabilities. A further step is to
claim that while there are basic capabilities, societies and
people could specify for themselves specific capabilities
(e.g. playing the violin). According to Cooke, cultures have
‘the freedom to specify further capabilities’ (p. 50). If this
is allowed, one could imagine that advanced technological
cultures could make use of human enhancement to add
specific capabilities, which would we allowed only to the
extent that basic capabilities are not diminished. However,
these steps remain firmly within the means-ends dualism.
The only point when Cooke comes near to questioning the
relation between capabilities and (enhancement) technol-
ogies is in what I see as the last step towards a more
interpretative view: she says that ‘many enhancements are
open to social interpretation’ and admits that ‘concepts like
health, disease and malady are normative’ (p. 57). (How-
ever, she retains a distinction between these more ‘objec-
tive’ concepts and ‘concepts that go into interpreting social
capabilities’.) Thus, in Cooke’s interpretation of Sen’s
capability approach there is room for interpretation and
there is no reason why Nussbaum could not agree with this.
A capability approach to ethics of human enhancement,
then, would require us to imagine forms of life in which
capabilities are changed or added—capabilities and tech-
nological changes which are always interpreted.
So far, it looks as if Nussbaum (and perhaps Sen also)
would go some way towards a ‘strong’ interpretative
understanding of capabilities of the sort I suggested above
by using the term hermeneutic. However, in her third
response to her relativist opponent Nussbaum then takes a
Kantian-Rawlsian turn. She uses Rawls’s phrase ‘free-
standing’: the list is a ‘freestanding’ moral conception,
‘freestanding’ in the sense that it is not grounded in
‘metaphysical ideas of the sort that divide people along
lines of culture and religion’ (Nussbaum 2006, p. 79), it
does not rely on ‘a particular metaphysical or teleological
view’ (Nussbaum 2000, p. 83). With these remarks,
Nussbaum departs not only from Grotius (who based his
view on a metaphysical theory of human nature) but also
introduces again the liberal Kantian-Rawlsian line of her
version of the capability approach,5 which stands in tension
with the more interpretative, particularist line. The first line
echoes the liberal-philosophical conception of a ‘pure’
public sphere of politics separated from the private sphere
with its cultural and religious views. In this view, capa-
bilities are seen as belong to the first sphere, notions that
‘can be endorsed by people who otherwise have very dif-
ferent conceptions of the ultimate meaning and purpose of
life’ (Nussbaum 2006, p. 79). But from a full-blown her-
meneutic perspective, such a purified notion does not make
sense; the interpretation of capabilities depends—among
other things—on such ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’ views, on
the meaning and purpose we ascribe to human life. Such
views differ and, as Jo¨mann et al. phrase what they call the
‘relativist’ objection, it is ‘unreasonable to believe that we
can sidestep fundamental cultural discrepancies by appeal
to an ‘‘overlapping consensus’’ as regards norms and val-
ues’ (Jo¨mann et al. 2001, p. 68). To what extent there really
are such fundamental differences is questionable, but in
any case there are relevant differences and arguably
Nussbaum’s account needs to be more sensitive to them.
Furthermore, the interpretation of capabilities also depends
on technological developments, which, as argued, are not
just a means to realise goals as ‘freestanding’ moral con-
ceptions, but also shape these goals and purposes. More-
over, the list is then not merely a ‘partial’ moral conception
introduced for political purposes only (p. 79) but a ‘sub-
stantive’ ideal of the good life—one that is not freestanding
but dependent on social, technological, and cultural con-
text. Leaving aside well-known differences between the
capability approach and Rawlsian contractarianism,6
Nussbaum’s Kantian and Rawlsian intuitions prevent her
from fully embracing this hermeneutic route.
Conclusion
Capability thinking has moved from being an approach to
‘human development’ (as conceived by Sen) to an articu-
lation of ‘human dignity’ (Nussbaum) and perhaps a space
of possibilities for ‘the good life’ or ‘human excellence’.
Should it also broaden its scope—or indeed change its
orientation—to ‘human enhancement’?
This paper suggests that the capability approach can be a
useful way of to specify the level of analysis in human
enhancement discussions, moving the focus from ‘genes’,
‘code’ or ‘neurons’ to capabilities. However, it has been
argued that any interpretation of what these capabilities
mean is itself dependent on the techno-human practices
under discussion. When we use the capability approach as a
normative tool in ethics of information technologies,
therefore, we have to take into account that the concept we
use is not independent from the technologies we wish to
evaluate. Exploring alternative conceptions of human-
technology relations, we can learn from scientific and5 Nussbaum does often acknowledge this Rawlsian heritage but
strangely enough in Women and Human Development she presents
this conception as an interpretation of Aristotle: ‘As I interpret
Aristotle, he understood the core of his account of human functioning
to be a freestanding moral conception, not one that is deduced from
natural teleology or any non-moral source’ (Nussbaum 2000, p. 76).
6 For example, the capability approach is outcome-directed rather
than procedural (Nussbaum 2006, p. 82) and it ‘stresses the animal
and material underpinnings of human freedom (p. 88).
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hermeneutical approaches, which could re-interpret and
enrich the capability approach. One way to do this is to
focus on the interpretative side of the capability approach
as proposed above.
I conclude that instead of facing a choice between
development (or dignity, excellence) and enhancement, we
have to reflect on how we want to shape our lives, our
societies, and ourselves as humans and as individuals. For
this purpose, we have to engage in a cumbersome herme-
neutics that dances between unstable interpretations of
technological changes, changes in the meaning of capa-
bilities, changes in individual and societal practices, value
changes, and dynamic relations between these changes.
Then we can make up our minds about which changes we
really want, taking into account that there will always be
limits to what we can control and guide—as humans or as
posthumans.
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